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Comment
The Medical Malpractice Crisis:
A Problem with No Answer?
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, medical malpractice insurance premiums have skyrock-
eted for doctors' around the country. As a result, many doctors have moved to
more general practices, 2 have moved to states in which insurance premiums
are cheaper,3 or have given up practicing medicine altogether. 4 These prob-
lems have reached epidemic proportions in many states,6 precipitating gov-
1. For purposes of this Comment, the author will refer to doctors' rising insur-
ance premiums when discussing the medical malpractice liability crisis. The liability
crisis, however, is not limited to doctors. See, e.g., Emily V. Cornell, Addressing the
Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis (NGA Ctr. for Best Practices, Issue Brief, Dec.
5, 2002), available at http://www.nga.org/cda/files/l102MEDMALPRACTICE.pdf
(describing the medical malpractice problem as one involving "hospital emergency
rooms, trauma centers, birthing centers, and nursing homes," in addition to individual
doctors).
2. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CONFRONTING THE NEW HEALTH
CARE CRISIS: IMPROVING HEALTH CARE QUALITY AND LOWERING COSTS BY FIXING
OUR MEDICAL LIABILITY SYSTEM 4 (July 25, 2002), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/d
altcp/reprots/litrefm.htm [hereinafter, CONFRONTING]; see also American Medical
Association, Professional Liability Insurance: Clamoring for Relief (Apr. 24, 2002).
The AMA argues that "liability rates are driving physicians from their practices, leav-
ing patients vulnerable and the entire field of medicine in a state of turmoil." Id.
3. CONFRONTING, supra note 2, at 3.
4. Id.
5. See Susan Jones, Medical Malpractice Crisis Prompts New Push for Reform,
CYBERCAST NEWS SERV., Feb. 10, 2004, available at http://www.cnsnews.com/Nation
/archive/200402/NAT20040210a.html (stating that "[i]t won't matter if Americans
have health insurance-if there are no doctors around to treat them").
6. The American Medical Association ("AMA") lists 19 states as being in a
"full-blown medical liability crisis." American Medical Association, 19 States Now in
Full-blown Medical Liability Crisis, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/
article/6282-7347.html (last updated Oct. 6, 2003). The AMA lists these states as
Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri,
New Jersey, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. Breaking some of the problems down
state by state, the AMA describes Arkansas's problem as having "[m]ore than 50
percent of" the state's doctors reporting "that they have been forced to reduce or dis-
continue one or more medical services ... due to rapidly increasing medical premi-
ums"; in Illinois, the AMA claims "hospitals and small towns are in jeopardy because
of physicians no longer performing certain procedures such as brain surgery and de-
1
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emiment involvement at both the state and federal levels, in what has been
deemed a "medical malpractice crisis."'7 Because medical malpractice law has
failed on many levels, experts tend to blame the "medical malpractice crisis
'8
on at least one of three things: 1) too much litigation,9 2) the recent downturn
in the economy,' 0 and 3) unregulated doctors making too many mistakes.1 1
Thus, a tripartite relationship exists between trial lawyers, insurance compa-
nies, and doctors, in which each group points a finger at the other.' 2 Despite
the finger-pointing, some commentators argue that the three big players are
livering babies"; in Kentucky, high-risk specialists "including emergency room phy-
sicians and general surgeons" have found "increases in their liability premiums ...
between 87 to 200 percent," and "[n]early one-quarter of the state's physicians say
medical liability concerns make them consider leaving the state"; in Missouri, doc-
tors' liability insurance premiums have risen over 60 percent in the course of a year;
and in North Carolina, hospitals have seen "professional liability insurance premium
increases of 400 to 500 percent" over a three year period. Id.
7. See Kathy Kendell, Comment, Latent Medical Errors and Maine's Statute of
Limitations for Medical Malpractice: A Discussion of the Issues, 53 ME. L. REv. 589,
599 (2001).
8. The phrase itself takes on different connotations. See David A. Hyman,
Medical Malpractice and the Tort System: What Do We Know and What (If Anything)
Should We Do About It?, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1639, 1639-40 (2002). Hyman describes
physicians complaining about a "liability coverage crisis," where "coverage is too
expensive or simply unavailable" and plaintiffs' lawyers complain about a "malprac-
tice crisis," where doctors "are routinely committing malpractice, and getting away
with it." Id.
9. See, e.g., Steven T. Masada, Comment, Australia's "Most Extreme Case ": A
New Alternative for U.S. Medical Malpractice Liability Reform, 13 PAC. RiM L. &
POL'Y J. 163, 169 (2004). Masada states that "[w]hile many factors likely contribute
to the U.S. medical malpractice crisis, the most prevalent catalysts for increasing
insurance premiums relate to a rise in medical malpractice litigation and certain in-
herent inefficiencies imbedded in the U.S. legal system." Id. (footnote omitted).
10. Comparing the current crisis to those of the 1970s, some commentators de-
scribe the crisis as a result of a "souring economy." See, e.g., Peter Zablotsky, From a
Whimper to a Bang: The Trend Toward Finding Occurrence Based Statues of Limita-
tions Governing Negligent Misdiagnosis of Diseases with Long Latency Periods Un-
constitutional, 103 DICK. L. REv. 455, 475 n.95 (1999).
11. David S. Casey, Jr., Perspectives From the Front Lines, 39 TRIAL 9 (Nov.
2003). Casey writes that "ATLA's position that the lack of insurance-rate regulation
is the cause of doctors' insurance woes was vindicated by California Insurance Com-
missioner John Garamendi, who slashed a major medical malpractice insurer's pro-
posed rate increase." Id. at 9.
12. See Robert E. McAfee, High Health Care Costs? Blame the Greed of Law-
yers, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 1994, at C8 (letter to the Editor of the Washington Post
by the AMA President) (where the AMA President blames "greedy lawyers" for the
medical malpractice crisis). See also Berkeley Rice, Do Doctors Kill 80,000 Patients
a Year?, MED. ECON., Nov. 21, 1994, at 46 (noting the blame for the medical mal-
practice crisis is often placed squarely on "killer doctors").
[Vol. 70
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 14
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol70/iss1/14
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS
doing their best within a system that simply does not work.13 Nevertheless,
each of the three takes an extreme position in the debate14 and little effective
change takes place.' 5 Compounding the problem is the fact that "statistics on
both the extent of litigation and amounts of awards are conflicting and diffi-
cult to come by."'
' 6
13. See, e.g., Thomas B. Metzloff, Understanding the Malpractice Wars, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1169, 1173 (1993) (reviewing PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL (1991)). Metzloff explains that Paul Weiler assesses the "best
available evidence" in concluding that "plaintiffs' lawyers are, by all accounts, doing
their best to identify meritorious claims; that juries are taking their work seriously;
and that insurers are trying to charge reasonable insurance rates based upon their best
estimates of future claims." Id.
14. See Medical Malpractice Referral Network, Medical Malpractice "Crisis"
Contrived, available at http://www.medical-malpractice-lawyers-attorneys.com/medi
cal malpractice_crisis.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2004). On this website, Dr. Sidney
Wolfe, director of Public Citizen's Health Research Group, argues that "[t]here are
serious ethical questions about doctors striking and preventing patients from getting
medical care." Id. Joan Claybrook, president of Public Citizen, states that "[dioctors
are falsely demonizing America's legal system rather than saving tens of thousands of
lives and litigation costs by preventing careless or unnecessary medical errors, such as
operating on the wrong part of the body." Id. While the statements contain grains of
truth, they are examples of one-sided finger-pointing by all three of the big players.
This author's opinion is that doctors strike because they are demoralized by their
increasing premiums, not because they do not care about the welfare of their patients.
15. See MIMI MARCHEV, NAT'L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, THE
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE CRISIS: OPPORTUNITY FOR STATE ACTION,
(2002). Marchev explains that "[c]onflicts among insurance companies, the medical
profession, and trial lawyers are inherent to the debate over how to solve the crisis
and often create a chilling effect on efforts to improve patient safety." Id. at 1.
Marchev continues:
Insurers and doctors blame "predatory" trial attorneys, "frivolous" law
suits, and "out of control" juries for the spike in insurance premiums. In
turn, consumer groups accuse insurance companies of "price gouging,"
while plaintiffs' attorneys point to an exorbitant rate of medical errors and
the need to deter malpractice and provide compensation to injured pa-
tients. This animosity and defensiveness create a closed environment and
impede state efforts to address broader issues of patient safety.
Id.
16. Id. at 5. Marchev cites research by Jury Verdict Research group, a firm often
cited by the insurance companies, which claims "that the median jury award in medi-
cal malpractice cases rose from $500,000 in 1995 to $1,000,000 in the year 2000." Id.
(citing Jury Verdict Research, Horsham, Pa. at http://www.juryverdictresearch.com
(last visited Apr. 5, 2005)). The author finds such well-rounded numbers invalid on
their face. Marchev contrasts Jury Verdict Research's statistics with those of a Bureau
of Justice Statistics survey, which cites $285,576 as the median award for 1996,
"about half the amount cited by Jury Verdict Research for that same year." Id. (citing
MARIKA F.X. LITRAS ET AL., TORT TRIALS AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 1996
2005]
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Problems with the availability and affordability of liability insurance
have been the impetus for much of the reform efforts throughout the coun-
try, 17 but the problems in medical malpractice law are much further-reaching
than doctors' rising insurance premiums.18 While these skyrocketing premi-
ums indicate that medical malpractice law has failed to protect doctors, the
law has also failed to protect patients. 19 Medical malpractice law neither de-
ters future negligence by doctors 20 nor adequately compensates those who are
injured by physician negligence. 2' Currently, laws across the country do not
work, and their failure presses us to re-examine the purposes of the legislative
reforms that continue to be enacted.
Any future success the law may find will be realized only if the reforms
put in place ensure that care is both "cost effective and safe,, 22 because the
failure of past reforms is due in part to the fact that they focus almost entirely
(U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin No. NCJ 179769, Aug.
2000).
17. See, e.g., Kenneth D. Kranz, Tort Reform 1997-98: Profits vs. People, 25
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 161 (1998). Kranz explains:
In response to a perceived medical malpractice insurance crisis, the 1985
Legislature attempted to offer relief in what was known as the Compre-
hensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1985 (1985 Act). Before the
ink dried on the 1985 Act, the Legislature enacted the much more com-
prehensive Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986 (1986 Act). The 1986
Act was conceived as an effort to relieve the general liability insurance af-
fordability and availability "crisis" perceived to exist throughout much of
the business community.
Id. at 162-63 (footnotes omitted).
18. See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the
Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1183-84 (1992)
(citing CAL. MED. Ass'N & CAL. HoSP. ASS'N, REPORT ON THE MEDICAL INS.
FEASIBILITY STUDY 101 (Don H. Mills ed., 1977)). The study found that less than 10
percent of negligently injured patients sued. Id. Even for the most severely injured
plaintiffs, the study concluded that less than I in 6 filed suit. Id. See also id. (citing
LEON S. POCINKI ET AL, THE INCIDENCE OF IATROGENIC INJURIES 50 (1973)) (finding
that only 6 percent of negligently injured patients files suit); id. (citing HARVARD
MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY GROUP, PATIENTS, DOCTORS AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL
INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK 7-1
(Report of the Harvard Medical Practice Study to the State of New York, 1990))
(where the Harvard Medical Practice Study found that in New York "eight times as
many patients suffer an injury from medical negligence as there are malpractice
claims," and "there are about sixteen times as many patients who suffer an injury
from negligence as there are persons who receive compensation through the tort sys-
tem").
19. See HARVARD MED. PRACTICE STUDY GROUP, supra note 18.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors:
Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1595 (2002).
[Vol. 70
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on being cost effective and neglect current problems in patient care. Reform
efforts need to do more than protect doctors from being run out of their pro-
fessions by skyrocketing premiums. Reforms also need to protect patients,
both by deterring doctors' negligent conduct and by adequately compensating
victims who have been harmed by negligent medical care. Experts who have
conducted empirical studies suggest reforms such as no-fault insurance,2 3 but
these suggestions have thus far received little support. 24 History shows that if
anything is going to get done, it will get done along political lines.25 This will
require give and take from each of the three big players.
26
This Comment will look at the changes that have been made in the way
of tort reform and will analyze the problems that past tort reform efforts have
ignored. The purpose of this Comment is not to suggest an easy, one-size-fits-
all solution to the medical malpractice problems we face but rather to expose
some of the problems that past efforts have missed, in the hope that state leg-
islatures will learn from their past mistakes. This Comment will also suggest
alternative remedies to get the health care system on its way to becoming a
system where fewer medical mistakes are made, injured plaintiffs are ade-
quately compensated, and doctors can most effectively and efficiently oper-
ate.
27
23. See Jeffrey O'Connell, A Proposed Remedy for Mississippi's Medical Mal-
practice Miseries, 22 Miss. C. L. REv. 1 (2002). See also Hyman, supra note 8; Mello
& Brennan, supra note 22; Larry I. Palmer, Patient Safety, Risk Reduction, and the
Law, 36 Hous. L. REv. 1609 (1999); David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, To-
ward a Workable Model of "No-Fault" Compensation for Medical Injury in the Un-
tied States, 27 AM. J. L. & MED. 225 (2001).
24. But see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.301-.316 (West 2001); VA. CODE ANN. §§
38.2-5000 to -5021 (Michie 2002).
25. Hyman, supra note 8. See also Paul C. Weiler, The Case for No-fault Medi-
cal Liability, 52 MD. L. REV. 908, 909-10 (1993). Weiler comments that the "legisla-
tive preoccupation with medical malpractice seems curious" given that the "total cost
of malpractice insurance ... is only a tiny fraction of the nation's $130 billion in tort
liability expenditures." Id. at 909. But, Weiler further explains that "[t]here is, of
course, a political explanation for this legislative preoccupation. The principal targets
of malpractice litigation are not faceless corporations, such as product manufacturers,
but real, live doctors." Id. at 910. Weiler continues, saying that "a malpractice suit
challenges the professional performance, reputation, and identity of a doctor" and
"both legislatures and voters can more readily empathize with the plight of their fam-
ily doctor than, for example, drug manufacturers [so] statutory relief has regularly
been forthcoming." Id.
26. See Thomas P. Hagen, Note, "This May Sting a Little "--A Solution to the
Medical Malpractice Crisis Requires Insurers, Doctors, Patients, and Lawyers to
Take Their Medicine, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 147, 161 (1992). Hagen explains that in
order for a system which protects both doctors and patients to be implemented, there
must be "careful study and contemplation of all points of view." Id.
27. Evidence suggests that the medical malpractice crisis leads doctors to prac-
tice "defensive medicine," whereby doctors are so afraid of legal exposure that they
order and prescribe more treatment than they feel is necessary. Id. at 148 & n.4.
2005]
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Again, this will take action by each of the big three. 28 For insurance
companies, these changes include experience-rating doctors' insurance pre-
miums, 29 so that the problems caused by a few of the doctors are not borne by
the whole profession. Statistics suggest that a small number of doctors are at
the root of substandard care problems. These problem doctors should absorb
costs commensurate with their neglect. Reform should also involve planning
for the insurance cycle by setting back rainy day reserves so that malpractice
premiums reflect insurance industry costs more and the state of the economy
less.30 For doctors and insurance companies, reform should include distribut-
ing insurance rates across the medical specialties so that specialists are not
squeezed out of the profession. For plaintiffs' attorneys, reform should in-
clude submission of claims to screening panels (or pre-suit certification of
cases) in order to stop the administrative costs imposed by frivolous suits.
31
Because successful reform must account for both the doctor and patient
crises in medicine, these proposals take a comprehensive look at the concerns
voiced by all three players. 3In order to properly analyze their probability of
success, one must first understand the history behind the current crisis.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS
A. History
Although medical malpractice litigation began in the mid-1800s,
33
medical malpractice cases were rare until the 1970s. 34 Prior to 1960, only
28. See MARCHEV, supra note 15, at 21 (explaining that a "comprehensive ap-
proach to the medical malpractice insurance crisis that addresses tort and insurance
reform in conjunction with reporting requirements and other strategies aimed at re-
ducing medical errors may be the most effective course of action for states").
29. See, e.g., Gary M. Fournier & Melayne Morgan Mclnnes, The Case for Ex-
perience Rating in Medical Malpractice Insurance: An Empirical Evaluation, 68 J.
R]SK & INS. 255 (2001).
30. If insurance companies are going to continue increasing premiums in years in
which they turn significant profits, this practice should be offset with regulations
requiring that they set back rainy day reserves.
31. See, e.g., Jean A. Macchiaroli, Medical Malpractice Screening Panels: Pro-
posed Model Legislation to Cure Judicial Ills, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 181 (1990).
32. See Hagen, supra note 26, at 161 (explaining that "reform must strike a bal-
ance that ensures the highest quality health care, the lowest possible malpractice in-
surance rates, and an efficient and discriminating tort system that compensates vic-
tims while deterring tortfeasors from reckless conduct and frivolous plaintiffs and
attorneys from spurious claims").
33. See Rima J. Oken, Note, Curing Healthcare Providers' Failure to Adminis-
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about one in seven doctors could expect to be sued in his entire career.35 Now
about one in seven doctors is sued each year.36 Most experts agree that the
first wave of medical malpractice insurance problems began in the 1970s.
37
One commentator describes this first wave of problems as an "availability
crisis, ' 3 8 in which insurers became unwilling to underwrite medical liability
insurance, 39 because they were experiencing depressed investment income as
a result of a "souring economy' 40 and a large "oil crisis.",4 1 Insurers dropped
out of the market,42 and doctors around the country began to see their mal-
practice premiums soar.4 3 To deal with the availability crisis of the 1970s,44
most state legislatures enacted tort reforms in the mid-1970s, seeking both to
reduce the frequency of suits45 and to curtail the severity of the awards. 46 One
such state was California, which enacted the Medical Injury Compensation
Reform Act (MICRA) 47 in 1975. 41
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See Kendell, supra note 7, at 601 (explaining that it "is undisputed .. that
by the early 1970s doctors in many areas of the country began to experience signifi-
cant increases in their malpractice premiums").
38. See Hagen, supra note 26, at 150.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 151.
42. See IAIN HAY, MONEY, MEDICINE, AND MALPRACTICE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY
89 (1992). During the late 1970s, the number of medical malpractice insurers dropped
from over one hundred to around twelve nationally. Id.
43. See Randall R. Bovbjerg, Legislation on Medical Malpractice: Further De-
velopments and a Preliminary Report Card, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 499, 502-03
(1989). The premiums doctors paid during the 1970s tripled. Id.
44. See Allen Redlich, Ending the Never-ending Medical Malpractice Crisis, 38
ME. L. REv. 283, 316-24 (1986) (discussing the tort reform actions taken in forty-nine
states in the mid- 1970s).
45. Hagen, supra note 26, at 157. Hagen explains that states tried to reduce the
frequency of suits "by making it difficult or impossible for a plaintiff to bring any
malpractice suit, by encouraging settlement, and by deterring frivolous claims." Id.
(footnotes omitted).
46. Id. at 157-58. States attempted to reduce the size of awards "by establishing
caps, revising the treatment of collateral source compensation, and encouraging peri-
odic payment of awards." Id. (footnotes omitted).
47. Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975, ch. 1, 1975 Cal. Stat.
3969 (codified at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 2003); CAL. CIV. CODE §§
3333.1-.2 (West 1997); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 340.5, 364, 365, 1295 (West 1982);
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 667.7 (West 1987)).
48. See Grace Vandecruze, Has the Tide Begun to Turn for Medical Malprac-
tice?, 15 HEALTH LAW. 15, 15 (2002). Since enacting MICRA in 1975, California's
malpractice premiums have risen 167 percent, compared to a 505 percent increase in
the rest of the United States, according to the American Medical Association. Id.; see
also CONFRONTING, supra note 2, at 17 ("California has more than 25 years of experi-
2005]
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A second wave of medical liability problems developed in the 1980s.
One commentator describes this crisis as one not of "availability" like the
1970s 49 but rather one of "affordability." 50 During this second wave of prob-
lems, there was a renewal of reform efforts much like the efforts of the
1970s.
5 1
Despite the tort reforms of the 1970s and 1980s, a crisis in medical li-
ability has returned again, and this time the federal government is considering
getting involved. If the problems of the 1970s and 1980s can be categorized
as problems of "availability" and "affordability," respectively, this third wave
of problems encompasses those encountered in both of the first two waves.
The availability crisis peaked in 2002, when St. Paul Fire and Marine
Insurance Co., which was the nation's largest malpractice carrier52 reportedly
insuring somewhere between 9 percent and 10 percent of doctors nation-
wide,53 left the medical liability insurance arena altogether. 54 Additionally,
PHICO and Frontier Insurance Group pulled out of the malpractice market,
55
and MIXX stopped providing malpractice coverage in every state except New
Jersey.56 These departures left doctors with few insurance options.57
In this third wave, affordability problems have coincided with this avail-
ability crisis. In 2002, for example, the state of Nevada faced problems in
malpractice affordability on such a grand scale that the University of Nevada
Medical Center closed its trauma center for ten days. 58 Surgeons quit working
ence with this reform. It has been a success. Doctors are not leaving California. Insur-
ance premiums have risen much more slowly than in the rest of the country without
any effect on the quality of care received by residents of California."). MICRA has
become the model followed by many states when enacting malpractice reforms and is
the model under which the current administration considers enacting federal legisla-
tion.
49. Hagen, supra note 26, at 152.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 154.
52. CONFRONTING, supra note 2, at 14.
53. Id.
54. Id. St. Paul's exit from the marketplace left an estimated 750 hospitals and
42,000 doctors without coverage. Medical Liability Insurance: Looming Crisis?,
TRENDWATCH, (Advancing Health in America), June 2002, at 1 [hereinafter TREND-
WATCH].
55. CONFRONTING, supra note 2, at 14.
56. Id.
57. William Poe, Malpractice Malaise, ST. LOUIS COM. MAG., Oct. 2003. A
financial risk manager for one insurance agency explains that St. Paul's departure
from the market makes it so "[tihere are very limited carriers now for medical mal-
practice insurance, and their appetite is very narrow." Id.
58. William Booth, Las Vegas Trauma Center Closes as Doctors Quit: Surgeons
Cite Rising Costs of Malpractice Insurance, Lawsuits-a Growing National Problem,
WASH. POST, July 4, 2002, at A2.
[Vol. 70
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because they could not afford insurance premiums 59 that had risen from
$40,000 to $200,000 per year for some doctors. 60 To illustrate the severity of
this problem, one need only consider that a surgeon-who faces one of the
greatest risks of being sued and thus the greatest burden of rising malpractice
premiums-has little incentive to continue practicing medicine at $300,000
per year when he must pay $200,00061 for malpractice insurance. This prob-
lem of affordability is not limited to the state of Nevada. It has spread
throughout the country,62 driving some doctors63 out of their professions and
making emergency care unavailable in some areas of the country. 64
These problems of affordability and availability of liability insurance for
doctors are real, and they have driven most recent tort reform efforts through-
out the country. These reforms have come by way of tort law changes aimed
at decreasing plaintiffs' recoveries and reducing the number of lawsuits filed
59. CONFRONTING, supra note 2, at 2.
60. Id.
61. This $200,000 figure is a reality for many doctors. See Joelle Babula, Medi-
cal Malpractice Crisis: Insurance Costs Driving Doctors Away, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-
JOURNAL, Jan. 23, 2002 (labeling obstetricians as the doctors who "are bearing the
brunt of the rate jumps," and citing as an example a physician whose rates jumped
from $46,000 to $225,000 between 2001 and 2002).
62. See MARCHEV, supra note 15, at 4. Marchev explains that "malpractice in-
surance premiums vary widely throughout the United States with doctors paying
vastly different amounts depending on their specialty [and] geographic location." Id.
Marchev then explains that "an obstetrician practicing in Florida can pay as much as
$200,000 for an annual malpractice premium, whereas the same specialist would pay
$73,000 in New Jersey and $25,000 in Maine." Id. (citing Trends in 2001 Rates for
Physicians 'Medical Professional Liability Insurance, MED. LIABILITY MONITOR, Oct.
2001).
63. See CONFRONTING, supra note 2. Predominantly, our surgeons and
OB/GYNs are hit hardest with rising malpractice premiums. Id. at 9.
64. In Pennsylvania, many doctors left their practices, when they could no longer
afford malpractice premiums. See id. at 9 (noting a Chester County poll in January
2001, in which 65 percent of doctors said they were seriously considering moving
their practices to another state) (citing Doctors and Patients are at Risk,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Jan. 19, 2001); see also id. (stating that in three health care
facilities in one area of Philadelphia, all twelve orthopedic surgeons left their prac-
tices when insurance premiums doubled to $106,000 a year in 2001) (citing Rising
Costs of Insurance Sends Doctors Scurrying, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Dec. 21,
2000); id. (stating that in Mississippi, many of the state's smaller communities no
longer have doctors who will deliver babies) (citing Exodus of Doctors Causing Cri-
sisfor Moms-to-be in Mississippi, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 11, 2002); id. at 4 (stating
that in New Jersey, 65 percent of the hospitals report that doctors are leaving because
premiums have increased so rapidly, at 250 percent over a three year period) (citing
Press Release, American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Red Alert
Facts: The Professional Liability Insurance Crisis (May 2002)); id. at 12 (stating that




Gregg: Gregg: Medical Malpractice Crisis:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2005
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
against doctors. The medical malpractice crisis, however, reaches much fur-
ther than these burdens that doctors have faced. Medical malpractice law has
failed to protect doctors, but it has equally failed to protect patients.65 The law
neither deters negligent conduct by doctors66 nor appropriately compensates
those who have been injured by doctors' negligent care.
67
B. The Wrong Claims
One of the major goals of tort law is deterrence. 68 In medical malprac-
tice law, the goal is that doctors will reduce or eliminate their unsafe medical
practices if they know they will be held accountable for wrongdoing to pa-
tients. Medical malpractice law has done a poor job of meeting this goal.
Many of malpractice law's problems stem from what Professor Phillip
Peters describes as "too many clams and too few claims.",69 On one hand, too
many meritless suits are being filed.7° On the other hand, many negligently
65. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, To ERR Is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH
SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et al., eds., 1999). Between 44,000 and 98,000 Americans die
in hospitals each year as a result of preventable medical errors. Id. at 1. See also Mi-
chael J. Berens, Infection Epidemic Carves Deadly Path, CHICAGO TRIB. July 21,
2002, at Cl. Berens reports that about 75,000 Americans die each year because of
infections they acquired during their hospital stay-infections that "were preventable,
the result of unsanitary facilities, germ-laden instruments, unwashed hands and other
lapses." Id.
66. HARVARD MED. PRACTICE STUDY GROUP, supra note 18. This study found
that only I in 8 medical errors committed in hospitals results in a malpractice claim.
Id.
67. Id.
68. See Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U.
KAN. L. REv. 115, 115 (1993) ("Tort law seeks to reduce injury by deterring unsafe
behavior and [this] goal informs tort standards for behavior."). See also Randall R.
Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain & Suffering", 83
Nw. U. L. REv. 908, 934 (1989).
69. Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Medical Malpractice Crisis, Lecture at Gannet Hall,
University of Missouri-Columbia (Oct. 6, 2003). See also David A. Hyman, Medical
Malpractice and System Reform: Of Babies and Bathwater, HEALTH AFF., Jan./Feb.
2000, at 258, 258 (reviewing STEPHEN L. FIELDING, THE PRACTICE OF UNCERTAINTY:
VOICES OF PHYSICIANS AND PATIENTS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS (1999))
(explaining the crisis by saying that "[d]epending on one's perspective, there is too
much medical malpractice litigation or not enough; contingent fee arrangements cre-
ate an obscene form of bounty hunting or are absolutely necessary to ensure justice;
physicians should not be second-guessed by those too dumb to avoid jury service or
the jury system works just fine; and legislators who enact tort reform are protecting
fat-cat doctors or have prudently restrained a tort system run amok").
70. See, e.g., Alan Feigenbaum, Special Juries: Deterring Spurious Medical
Malpractice Litigation in State Courts, 24 CARDOZO L. REv. 1361, 1378 (2003) (stat-
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injured patients do not bring suit and are not compensated for their injuries. 7 1
Several studies have found that as little as one in thirty patients who are neg-
ligently injured by medical mistakes files suit against the doctor responsi-
ble.72 Such low figures are due in part to attorneys' unwillingness to take
malpractice claims.73 Medical malpractice lawsuits are difficult to win74 be-
cause jurors are typically pro-doctor.75 Additionally, unless the patient has
suffered big damages, the cost 76 and the difficulty of bringing a medical mal-
practice suit makes it unfeasible for a plaintiffs' attorney to proceed with the
71. See, e.g., Thomas R. McLean, Crossing the Quality Chasm: Autonomous
Physician Extenders Will Necessitate a Shift to Enterprise Liability Coverage for
Health Care Delivery, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 239 (2002). McLean says that "the current
system allows for otherwise worthy patients who have been injured by negligent phy-
sician extender care to go uncompensated." Id. at 269-70.
72. See Michael J. Saks, Medical Malpractice: Facing Real Problems and Find-
ing Real Solutions, 35 WM & MARY L. REv. 693, 703 (1994) (reviewing PAUL C.
WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION (1993)).
73. See Saks, supra note 18, at 1190. Professor Saks explains that even victims
who want to bring a claim "cannot realistically do so unless a lawyer agrees to handle
their case, and lawyers usually do not accept a case unless they see an acceptable
probability of economic success for themselves in doing so." Id. Saks further com-
ments that attorneys turn away cases for many reasons, which include the following:
the plaintiff is seen as too unsympathetic for the potential jury, the evidence is am-
biguous, or the attorney may lack needed experts or expertise. Id. at 1191.
74. See id.
75. See Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Role of the Jury in Modern Malpractice Law,
87 IOWA L. REv. 909, 932 (2002). Professor Peters explains that while
"[c]onventional wisdom assumes that juries will sympathize with injured plaintiffs
and will penalize wealthy physician defendants[,J ... jurors sympathize more with the
physicians who are sued than with the patients who sue them." Id. Peters cites a study
conducted by Ellen L. Leggett, in which Leggett found that two-thirds of potentialjurors believe plaintiffs' lawyers have coerced plaintiffs into suing. Id. Peters also
cites a study of North Carolina juries conducted by Neil Vidmar, in which Vidmar
notes that comments such as "too many people sue their doctors" and "it is just going
to raise the health insurance rates for the rest of us" are commonly elicited from ju-
rors. Id. Peters also suggests the role of cognitive dissonance in juror attitudes, sug-
gesting that "the need to trust physicians with one's own life certainly gives each of
us a powerful motive to assume that physicians are rarely careless." Id. at 932-33.
76. See Weiler, supra note 25, at 916. Weiler explains that doctors adopt many
defensive mechanisms, such as "ordering extra laboratory tests, performing more
elaborate procedures ... , keeping more detailed medical records and spending more
time with patients," as a result of their perceptions about being sued. Id. Weiler posits
that defensive medicine costs twice as much annually as direct malpractice premiums.
Id. at 916-17 (citing Roger A. Reynolds et al., The Cost of Medical Professional
Liability, 257 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2776 (1987)).
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suit. For all of these reasons, many patients who are negligently injured by
doctors go uncompensated. 7
On the other hand, there are too many meritless suits filed. One Harvard
study found that 83 percent of claims filed by plaintiffs did not involve negli-
gence.78 Those frivolous suits impose a heavy cost on the system, driving up
doctors' insurance premiums 79 and fueling doctors' claims of a liability insur-
ance crisis.80 Because there is little correlation between actual negligence and
lawsuits filed against physicians, doctors are not deterred from making the
same mistakes in the future. Instead, doctors view the malpractice system as
a lottery.
82
Compounding the inability of malpractice law to deter future mistakes
are doctors' misperceptions about their malpractice risks. 83 In a survey of 739
New York physicians, doctors estimated that 60 percent of negligent injuries
led to claims. 84 But the empirical data indicated that only 13 percent of negli-
gent injuries led to claims.85 Furthermore, doctors estimated their annual rate
of being sued at more than three times its actual rate.86 Doctors are "demoral-
ized,",8 7 viewing the current system as a lottery88 in which their professional
reputations are up for grabs.8 9 These misperceptions-and indeed the realities
77. See Saks, supra note 72.
78. See HARVARD MED. PRACTICE STUDY GROUP, supra note 18. For analysis,
see PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY,
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION (1993). See also Tim
Cramm et al., Ascertaining Customary Care in Medical Malpractice Cases: Asking
Those Who Know, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 699 (2002).
79. Reasoning that litigation costs create doctors' out-of-control insurance premiums,
the AMA in Washington urges Congress to pass "MICRA-like reforms." See J. Edward
Hill, The Sleeping Giant: America's Physicians, Activism and the Medical Liability Crisis,
Address at Society of Laparoendoscopic Surgeons Annual Meeting (Sept. 30, 2004),
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/print/13882.html.
80. Id.
81. Shuman, supra note 68, at 120. Shuman explains that the "[d]eterrence the-
ory assumes that.., people are cognizant of the likelihood of tort sanctions for pro-
scribed behavior and choose safer alternatives to avoid those sanctions." Id. at 116.
82. See Feigenbaum, supra note 70, at 1372.
83. See Mello & Brennan, supra note 22, at 1609.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. Doctors estimated that almost 20 percent of their colleagues were sued
each year. Id. In actuality, less than 7 percent were sued each year. Id.
87. Peters, supra note 69.
88. Feigenbaum, supra note 70, at 1372. Feigenbaum comments that the per-
ceived number of medical malpractice lawsuits by doctors leads to feelings by doctors
that they "have been targeted." Id.
89. Id. Feigenbaum explains that "every patient that walks into the physician's
office is seen as a potential legal adversary." Id.
[Vol. 70
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 14
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol70/iss1/14
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS
of being sued9° as well-lead doctors to practice defensive medicine, 9 1 fur-
ther increasing the country's health care costs and fueling the inefficient
medical malpractice litigation train.
III. CHANGES IN MALPRACTICE LAW
The purpose behind reforms that legislatures have taken around the
country has predominantly been to reduce the premiums that doctors pay so
that doctors are not driven from their profession.92 These reforms can be bro-
ken down into two major categories: 1) those intended to curtail the amount
of the awards that injured patients can receive, and 2) those intended to weed
out frivolous lawsuits. In the area of curtailing payments, states have put caps
on compensatory damages, have abrogated the collateral source rule, have
installed periodic payment standards, have made it more difficult for plain-
tiffs to receive punitive damages, and have enacted statutes of repose. 93 In the
area of weeding out frivolous lawsuits, states have enacted screening panel
requirements, have enacted certification or affidavit requirements, have ap-
proved safe harbors, have placed restrictions on permissible expert witnesses,
and have installed sliding scale contingent fees. 9 4
Despite these many legislative changes throughout the 1970s, 1980s,
and up to the present, the medical malpractice crisis persists. This Comment
examines some of the most important of these reforms, including non-
economic damage caps, abrogation of the collateral source rule, limitations on
contingent fees, and implementation of screening panels. It concludes that the
benefits of non-economic damage caps and abrogation of the collateral source
rule, the two biggest reforms aimed at curtailing payments, are outweighed by
the harms caused to injured plaintiffs. Further, sliding scale contingent fees,
aimed at protecting a plaintiff by preserving more of a plaintiffs recovery for
himself, do just the opposite, making legitimate lawsuits unworthy of a plain-
90. See Oken, supra note 33, at 1968 n.252. One in seven doctors is sued for
malpractice each year. Id.
91. Jonathan J. Frankel, Medical Malpractice Law and Health Care Cost Care
Containment: Lessons for Reformers from the Clash of Cultures, 103 YALE L.J. 1297,
1298 (1994). Frankel says that "'[d]efensive medicine'-tests and procedures pro-
vided primarily to minimize the chance of future litigation-may cost the country an
additional $15 billion each year." Id. (citing Robert Pear, Clinton May Seek Lid on
Doctor Fees and Liability Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1993, at Al, A14).
92. There have been some limited efforts to improve medical quality, like im-
plementing peer review requirements, increasing disciplinary board powers, imple-
menting reporting requirements, and implementing requirements for continuing medi-
cal education.
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tiff attorney's risk. All of these reforms produce a system where the injured
patient is not protected.
Instead of these current reforms which put the injured patients' interests
last, tort reform should come in the form of screening panels which could
prevent frivolous lawsuits and the costs they entail. Within the screening
panel system, attorneys who continue to bring frivolous lawsuits should be
prevented from bringing future malpractice claims.
Beyond these tort reform measures aimed directly at trial lawyers, this
Comment looks at reforms in the medical profession and insurance indus-
try-proposals that have received little support in an atmosphere in which
state legislatures have primarily looked to curtail awards and prevent frivo-
lous suits. But states should create systems in which problem doctors are held
accountable and systems in which doctors take care of their own, spreading
insurance premiums for the high-risk medical specialties throughout the
medical profession. Finally, this Comment argues for changes in insurance
industry regulations. It calls for the industry to set back rainy day reserves to
account for the insurance cycle and calls for the industry to rate the experi-
ence of doctors when setting malpractice liability insurance premiums.
IV. CHANGES IN MALPRACTICE LAW: THE LEGAL PROFESSION
A. Reforms to Curtail Payments
1. Limitations on Non-economic Damage Awards
The biggest "reforms" that have taken place around the country have
been in direct response to doctors' claims that insurance premiums are out of
control. The most commonly adopted reform is a limitation on non-economic
damages, such as pain and suffering. 95 Proponents of caps argue that non-
economic damages are too imprecise by their very nature. 96 They argue that
95. See Elizabeth Stewart Poisson, Comment, Addressing the Impropriety of
Statutory Caps on Pain and Suffering Awards in the Medical Liability System, 82
N.C. L. REV. 759 (2004). Poisson addresses legislators' common use of "pain and
suffering" interchangeably with "non-economic damages." Id. at 761 n.7. She ex-
plains that these non-economic damages include "'damages for physical and emo-
tional pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, mental anguish, disfig-
urement, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of society and companionship, loss of consor-
tium (other than loss of domestic service), hedonic damages, injury to reputation, and
all other nonpecuinary losses of any kind or nature."' Id. (quoting Help Efficient,
Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2002, H.R. 4600, 107th
Cong. § 9(15)).
96. Id. at 772. Poisson explains that proponents of caps argue that "pain and
suffering awards by their nature are too intangible to allow jurors to make any legiti-
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non-economic caps are essential to prevent windfalls to plaintiffs97 and to
lower insurance costs for doctors. 98 They further argue that there is a ten-
dency of pain and suffering awards "to take on an unfairly punitive nature." 99
Legislators routinely adopt these limitations on non-economic awards be-
cause they subscribe to doctors' arguments about the variability of non-
economic awards-variability that doctors argue is perpetuated by courts that
are "'content to say that pain and suffering damages should amount to "fair
compensation" or a "reasonable amount," without any more definite guide'
to juries. 1° So, state legislatures enact caps to prevent the awards from get-
ting out of control, citing examples in which juries have returned excessive
pain and suffering awards.
A cap adopted in many states sets the maximum for non-economic dam-
ages at $250,000.' °l This is the level at which California originally set its cap
under MICRA. 10 2 States enacting a $250,000 limit'0 3 cite California's (al-
leged) success under MICRA;' ° 4 however, California's limit was enacted in
1975.105 Adjusted for inflation, this cap would now have to be more than




100. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 68, at 912 (quoting DON B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 545 (1973)).
101. See, e.g., GOVERNOR'S SELECT TASK FORCE ON HEALTHCARE PROF'L LIAB.
INS., FINAL REPORT 212, 218-21 (2003) (explaining the belief that the $250,000 figure
will work in Florida because it worked well in other states, including California).
102. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1997) (defining damages for non-
economic losses to include damages that "compensate for pain, suffering, inconven-
ience, physical impairment, disfigurement and other nonpecuniary damage").
103. See Paul C. Weiler, Fixing the Tail: The Place of Malpractice in Health Care
Reform, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 1157, 1173 (1995).
104. The extreme positions taken by the different players in the malpractice sys-
tem is illustrated in conflicting evidence regarding MICRA's success. One commenta-
tor explains that MICRA "has done little to help consumers because it has led to a
negligible reduction of health insurance rates in California." Jonathan J. Lewis, Re-
cent Development, Putting MICRA Under the Microscope: The Case for Repealing
California Civil Code Section 3333.1(A), 29 W. ST. U. L. REv. 173, 185 (2001).
Lewis describes the problems with MICRA, including "victims of medical malprac-
tice hav[ing] a difficult time obtaining representation." Id. at 191.
105. See Weiler, supra note 103, at 1180. Weiler describes legislatures' use of the
1975 dollar figure in these terms:
We all know what doctors would (rightly) say about a federal health care
"reform" . .. that capped for the future all physician income at a fixed
number reflecting the top California medical earnings back in the mid-
1970s. It is hard to seen, then, how doctors can legitimately ask for ex-
actly that kind of legal treatment for their (negligently-injured) patients.
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was compensated in 1975.106 States, such as Missouri, 10 7 which had already
enacted statutes limiting a plaintiff's recovery for non-economic damages,'
08
have now reduced the statutory cap 1°9 to an amount closer to California's
1975 ceiling.
On the national level, President George W. Bush has supported medical
malpractice reforms' 10 that are very similar to those enacted in 
California I t
and used the medical malpractice crisis as part of his platform for reelection.
Federal legislation has been introduced, which, like California's 
MICRA," 2
would limit non-economic recovery to $250,000 113 in medical malpractice
cases. Currently, no federal bills have been passed placing caps on pain and
suffering awards. For such caps to be enacted on the national level, the Presi-
dent and Congress will first have federalism hurdles to jump. Nevertheless,
the federal government's interest in the medical malpractice arena demon-
strates the extent of the current crisis, or at least the country's current percep-
tion of the crisis.
In addition to attacks on these procedural hurdles, the caps themselves
also receive heavy and well-deserved criticism. One of the biggest problems
106. See Poisson, supra note 95, at 773 n.70 (citing Bureau of Labor Statistics,
United States Dept. of Labor, Inflation Calculator, at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-
bin/cpicalc.pl).
107. In Missouri, the state legislature's enactment of a non-economic cap was
drastically undercut by the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District decision
in Scott v. SSM Healthcare St. Louis, 70 S.W.3d 560 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002). In Scott,
the court held that Missouri's statutory cap under Missouri Revised Statute Section
538.210 allowed the plaintiff to recover the cap amount for each occurrence of negli-
gence alleged against the hospital. Id. at 571. The plaintiff was allowed two recover-
ies of the $528,000 cap, totaling $1,056,000, because his injuries were the result of
two acts of malpractice. Id. at 564. The reasoning of the Scott court was a blatant end-
run around the Missouri legislature's cap. The decision rightfully scared insurers in
Missouri and led insurers to increase liability premiums. While Missouri's recent
enactment of a $350,000 cap, H.B. 393, 93d. Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2005)
(effective Aug. 28, 2005), seems unwise to this author, the Scott decision defied logic
and has fortunately been superseded by H.B. 393.
108. Mo. REV. STAT. § 538.210 (2000) (amended by H.B. 393, 93d. Gen. Assem.,
1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2005) (effective Aug. 28, 2005)).
109. H.B. 1304, Gen. Assem., 2d. Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2004).
110. See Jones, supra note 5 (quoting President Bush from a January 2004, trip to
Arkansas as saying, "We've got too many dam lawsuits, too many frivolous and junk
lawsuits that are affecting people.").
111. See generally Richard A. Oppel Jr., Bush Enters Fray Over Malpractice,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2003, at A24 (explaining that President Bush is considering a
plan to reduce non-economic damage recoveries to the California maximum of
$250,000); Richard W. Stevenson, President Asks Congress for Measures Against
Frivolous Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2003, at A24.
112. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1997).
113. See Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare Act of 2002,
H.R. 4600, 107th Cong.
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with non-economic caps is that they adversely affect those most severely
injured. 14 Whereas people who are not severely injured often find themselves
adequately compensated with or without caps-because their recoveries are
often less than the statutory cap' 15-those who are most severely injured see
their recoveries undercut. 6 One commentator explains that a major flaw of
cap statutes is that they are "separating patients into one general class,
whether they have valid or baseless claims, foster[ing] a medical malpractice
scheme where those that do have valid claims are arbitrarily penalized."' 17 In
other words, the recoveries of those most severely injured are the most re-
duced. This is a large price to pay when little empirical evidence exists that
these non-economic caps have any real, lasting impact on the availability and
affordability of liability insurance for doctors." 
8
Additionally, the caps that legislatures choose may be even more arbi-
trary than the non-economic damages that juries award. Juries have the bene-
fit of a judge's guidance, a case's facts, and specialized jury instructions.19
114. See Weiler supra note 103, at 1180. Weiler explains that a "legislative cap
exerts its influence almost exclusively upon the damages awarded to the most se-
verely injured victims-those left quadriplegic or blind, for example-while leaving
untouched the victims of much less severe injuries-such as a permanent limp or
scar." Id. Weiler further explains that
empirical research about personal injury litigation has consistently dem-
onstrated that victims of severe injuries recover a much smaller proportion
of their losses ... than do more modest injury victims. The addition of a
cap to the malpractice system simply aggravates this inequitable treatment
by forcing those few patients who are already worst-off to bear the lion's
share of the burden of tort reform and cost containment.
Id.
115. For less severely injured plaintiffs, recoveries are probably already below the
statutory cap.
116. See Poisson, supra note 95, at 784. Poisson cites to Ballinas v. N.Y. City
Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 7709194 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001), where an injured boy
received one of the nation's largest non-economic awards at $72 million. Poisson,
supra note, at 784 (citing Amy Johnson Conner, Med-Mal Lawyer Breaks Personal
Record with $107 Million Verdict, LAW. WKLY. USA, Jan. 7, 2002, at B 19). The doc-
tors in this case negligently caused him to contract meningitis, which caused his cere-
bral palsy. Id. As a result, the boy is confined to a wheelchair and must have 24 hour
care. Id. Poisson explains that the boy's pain and suffering award, while extremely
large, and possibly excessive, would not be adequately compensated under a
$250,000 cap. Id. $250,000 would not adequately compensate a boy for the 60+ years
of torment that will accompany a condition in which his body is entirely crippled and
his mind untouched. Id.
117. See Feigenbaum, supra note 70, 1382.
118. See Edward C. Martin, Limiting Damages for Pain and Suffering: Arguments
Pro and Con, 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 317, 337-38 (1986). Martin reasons that plac-
ing caps on non-economic damages is "minimal at best," because severely injured
plaintiffs comprise a minority of plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases. Id. at 337.
119. See Poisson, supra note 95, at 780.
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Legislators, removed from the courtroom and the actual troubles a particular
plaintiff will face as a result of physician negligence' are instead forced to
make decisions based on partisan sources. 121 The arbitrariness in state legisla-
tures' cap determinations is shown by the fact that the $250,000 cap being
adopted in many states-and being considered by the federal government-
imitates a cap adopted over twenty-five years ago in California.
While caps at some level serve to rein in juries, the current proposals
and limits of $250,000 do not adequately compensate the most severely in-
jured plaintiffs. Simply put, two hundred fifty thousand dollars is insufficient
to remedy the pain and suffering endured by a patient who will spend the rest
of his life with a debilitating injury.
2. Abrogation of the Collateral Source Rule
Under traditional common law tort doctrine, payments that a plaintiff
receives from a collateral source-such as treatment expenses paid by the
injured plaintiff's health care provider and lost earnings paid by sick pay or
disability benefits' 22-- do not reduce the plaintiffs recovery from the defen-
dant. Some states, however, have abrogated the collateral source rulel 23 by
enacting legislation that either makes mandatory an offset for payment from
collateral sources124 or permits the jury to consider the collateral source pay-
ment when determining a plaintiff's award. 25 States have enacted such legis-
lation with the intent to reduce doctors' liability insurance premiums. These
collateral source reforms, however, ignore that plaintiffs must use these col-
lateral source payments to offset the litigation costs they owe their attor-
neys. 126 While doctors are insured for the legal costs they incur in defending
themselves against lawsuits,' 27 patients are not insured for the legal costs they
incur in recovering the tort remedies they deserve.1 28 As one commentator
explains, the financial costs to the injured patient for legal representation are
"just as much the byproduct of negligent medical injury as are expenditures
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Weiler, supra note 103, at 1175.
123. One commentator lists Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minne-
sota, Montana, Nevada, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Washington,
and Wisconsin as among the states enacting legislation abolishing the collateral
source rule. See MARCHEV, supra note 15, at 10 tbl. 2.
124. See Weiler, supra note 103, 1173 n.3 1. These are "mandatory collateral
source offsets."
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on additional doctor and hospital treatment. ' 29 But the tort system does not
make the doctor liable for such costs-costs that are partially offset by the
collateral source rule.1
30
Additionally, the collateral source rule ensures that the wrongdoer-the
doctor (and the doctor's insurer)-pays for the wrong.131 Abrogating this rule
eliminates some of the wrongdoer's responsibility and places it on the victim.
It removes from the victim a source of payment for attorney's fees, which are
the product of the doctor's negligent act, and it places that burden onto the
negligently injured plaintiff.
The collateral source rule serves important judicial purposes. While
eliminating the rule curtails some of the problems of the malfunctioning mal-
practice system, these benefits are not only minimal but also come at a heavy
cost to the injured patient.
B. Reforms to Prevent Frivolous Lawsuits
1. Sliding Scale Contingent Fee Systems
Many states have enacted sliding scale contingent fee systems for plain-
tiffs' lawyers,132 predominantly for two major reasons. First, too little of an
injured plaintiffs recovery actually goes back into the patient's pocket. Pro-
ponents of limiting attorney contingent fee arrangements argue that by limit-
ing fees, more of the actual recovery is channeled back to the victims. Sec-
ond, there are too many frivolous lawsuits. In enacting sliding scale contin-
gent fee systems, state legislatures argue that frivolous suits are reduced be-
cause fewer attorneys file suit merely in the hopes of hitting the jackpot.
129. Id.
130. Id. Weiler notes that instead of protecting the patient's litigation expenses
with the collateral source rule, legislatures respond to the patient's lost legal costs by
arguing that "caps should be imposed upon the size of the contingent fee that patients
can be charged by their lawyers." Id. The author will address the effects of sliding
scale contingent fee arrangements later in this article.
131. See Lewis, supra note 104, at 196. Lewis explains that the
collateral source rule encourages people to obtain insurance and promotes
the practice of third parties providing aid to the injured[,J ... helps ensure
that plaintiffs are able to obtain representation[,] ... [and] protects against
arbitrariness with respect to medical malpractice tort claimants and all
other tort claimants by ensuring that the law in all tort cases is applied
evenly.
Id. at 196-97.
132. See MARCHEV, supra note 15, at 10 tbl. 2. Marchev lists California, Con-
necticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New
Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, Wisconsin and Wyoming as among
the states which have limited attorney contingency fees under tort reform statutes. Id.
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While these arguments correctly address two major problems in our cur-
rent malpractice law, contingent fee reforms often miss their mark. Instead of
protecting patients, such laws leave injured patients with no remedy at all.
133
Instead of preventing only the frivolous suits, such laws just as often prevent
legitimate suits. When a plaintiff's attorney takes a case on a contingency fee
basis and receives a percentage of the plaintiff's recovery,1 34 the attorney
recovers only if the plaintiff wins the lawsuit. Such an attorney fronts huge
amounts of money to cover litigation costs at the risk that the defendant doc-
tor will prevail and the attorney will go uncompensated for her hours of work.
Increasing this financial risk to the plaintiffs' attorneys is the fact that medical
negligence cases are difficult to win, because most juries are pro-doctor.'
35
Plaintiffs' lawyers use the large fees obtained in winning cases to offset the
financial losses incurred in losing cases, thereby securing their availability to
injured plaintiffs. Reducing attorneys' contingency fees makes these attor-
neys much less likely to take malpractice cases and undercuts injured pa-
tients' available remedies.
Under most states' professional ethics codes, attorneys are required to
give clients the choice of paying by the hour or choosing a contingency fee
arrangement. Clients choose to pay on the contingency fee basis because it
poses no financial risk to them and because they cannot afford to pay an at-
torney by the hour. The attorneys bear the financial risk. 136 This allows pa-
133. While this author supports contingent fees systems as the only means of
providing many injured plaintiffs with a remedy, other commentators have disagreed.
See, e.g., Lester Brickman, The Market for Contingent Fee-financed Tort Litigation:
Is it Price-competitive?, 25 CARDOZO L. REv. 65, 71-72 (2003). Brickman makes
several assertions regarding the unfairness in the contingent fee system, including the
following:
[T]hat contingent fee lawyers charging standard contingent fees are rou-
tinely overcharging some claimants because, in many instances, the repre-
sentation involves no meaningful risk of no or low recovery and therefore
the substantial risk premium in these instances yields unearned and un-
ethical windfall fees; ... that these windfall fees often amount to effective
rates of thousands of dollars an hour; ... that the gross overcharging of
tort claimants is not only in the interest of plaintiff lawyers but also bene-
fits defendant lawyers[;] . . .that contingent fee lawyers engage in con-
certed efforts to hide their effective hourly rates from public view; [and]
that the efforts at concealment of both effective hourly rates and risk lev-
els incommensurate with risk premiums being routinely charged plays an
important if not critical role in the tort reform wars currently being waged.
Id. at 71-73.
134. Oftentimes, this fee is one-third of the plaintiff's total recovery, after sub-
tracting the costs of litigation.
135. See Peters, supra note 75.
136. One commentator suggests that plaintiffs' attorneys' actual risk is exagger-
ated. See Brickman, supra note 133, at 72. Brickman argues that "contrary to the
claims of many tort lawyers, the actual risk level of most contingent fee lawyers'
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tients who are injured by physician negligence to bring lawsuits. Cutting back
on contingency fees awarded to plaintiffs' attorneys undercuts the attorneys'
incentive to take such cases. Without the attorneys taking the cases, injured
plaintiffs have no line of recourse for their injuries.
Instead of protecting injured patients' recoveries, contingent fee limita-
tions often prevent them. Although such fee limitations decrease the number
of frivolous lawsuits that plaintiffs' attorneys will file, they also undercut
patients' already limited abilities 137 to proceed with meritorious claims. Pre-
venting frivolous lawsuits can be better accomplished, without the resulting
detriment to injured plaintiffs, through other measures, including screening
panels.
2. Screening Panels
One reform that many states have enacted are screening panels, whereby
a panel, often comprised of a lawyer, a physician, 138 and a judge, 13' deter-
mines the merits of a claim before it is filed in court. These panels are de-
signed to eliminate meritless claims and their associated costs, to encourage
settlement of meritorious claims, and to decrease malpractice insurance costs
for doctors.
40
Although the panels have shown some success in reducing frivolous
claims, there have been accompanying problems. In some states, a panel's
decision does not bind the plaintiff.' 4' In these states, plaintiffs can merely
use the screening panel as a testing ground for their lawsuit and beef up their
case for trial if the first go-round proves unsuccessful.
42
In such states, these problems are essentially undercutting the entire
purpose of the screening panel system. Nevertheless, these problems can be
drastically reduced by holding plaintiffs' lawyers accountable for filing frivo-
lous suits. In order to prevent frivolous lawsuits, there needs to be some pun-
ishment for attorneys who continually file frivolous claims. Attorneys who
portfolios of cases does not justify the substantial risk premiums they uniformly
charge." Id.
137. See Saks, supra note 72.
138. In Massachusetts, the judge selects a doctor from a list of doctors which the
Massachusetts Medical Society submits to him. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60B
(2002). The physician must practice in the medical field in which the plaintiffs injury
occurred, and must practice outside the county where the defendant doctor practices
or lives. Id.
139. See Feigenbaum, supra note 70, at 1379.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1380.
142. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-5-14 to -20 (Michie 1996) (in which the
panel's report is not admissible at a later trial); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-6-701
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continue to file frivolous claims should no longer be allowed to file medical
malpractice lawsuits.143 Without such a provision in the screening panel stat-
utes, plaintiffs' attorneys will continue using the screening panels as a testing
ground for their suits.
Opponents of screening panels argue that they do not work. However,
evidence suggests that any problems with panels are the result of both gaps in
the statutes' 44 and poor timing in their passage. Many screening panel statutes
were enacted and overturned in a time when alternative forms of dispute reso-
lution were much less popular. Despite the arguments that screening panels
are not working, one commentator argues that they should be enacted in
every state, 145 but with more uniformity across the states.
146
V. CHANGES IN MALPRACTICE LAW: THE MEDICAL PROFESSION
The doctors who are at risk of being run out of their profession by sky-
rocketing insurance premiums are specialists, such as surgeons and OB-
GYNs. 147 General practitioners, on the other hand, are not being driven from
the medical profession. In fact, surgeons and OBGYNs are being driven into
general practice because the liability insurance premiums of a general practi-
tioner are affordable. This is a scary problem in many areas of the country,
where high-risk, injured and sick patients need immediate care and no emer-
gency or specialized care can be found.
Changes must be implemented in two ways to prevent this flight by
medical specialists. First, it may be time for the government to subsidize
these specialties. 148 The problem has reached epidemic proportions, with
143. Proposal of many Republicans and of John Edwards, Democratic candidate
for Vice-President, during his 2004 campaign for the Democratic nomination for
President. See John Edwards, Editorial, Let's Keep Doctor's in Business, WASH.
POST, May 20, 2003, at A19.
144. Screening panels do not work if plaintiffs' lawyers can use them as a testing
ground for their lawsuit.
145. See Macchiaroli, supra note 31, at 187.
146. Id. Macchiaroli attributes screening panels' varied success to the fact that
their "requirements and procedures vary considerably." Id.
147. See TRENDWATCH, supra note 54 (stating that the "[h]igh-risk specialties,
like obstetrics/gynecology and neurosurgery are most affected"); see also Patricia J.
Fowler, Medical Liability Insurance: Another Costly Crisis, MICHIGAN'S
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES: MSU FACULTY PERSPECTIVES (Mich. State Univ.
Extension), available at http://www.msue.msu.edu/msue/iac/transition/papers/medliab.
pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2005) (explaining that rising liability insurance premiums
have produced a shortage of physicians in the high-risk specialties like obstetrics and
emergency medicine).
148. See Comell, supra note 1, at 3 (citing AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS &
GYNECOLOGISTS, RADICAL, INNOVATIVE STATE LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES (ACOG State
Legislative Fact Sheet, 2002)). Arizona, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Nevada,
New York, North Carolina, Texas and Washington tried some form of subsidy pro-
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some areas of the country losing their surgeons and OBGYNs. 14 9 Second,
doctors should take care of their own, spreading these increasing costs
throughout the profession. If the doctors who are involved in general prac-
tices and the low-risk specialties would shoulder some of the insurance costs
of their high-risk colleagues, 50 liability insurance would be affordable for all
doctors.15' Doctors would not be forced into less risky practices, and patients
needing specialized and emergency care would be able to find it.
VI. CHANGES IN MALPRACTICE LAW: THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
A. Rainy Day Reserves Accounting for the Insurance Cycle
Efforts to reduce doctor's malpractice premiums often ignore the one
player that actually sets those premiums-the insurance industry. Accord-
ingly, many commentators have correlated doctors' rising liability insurance
premiums to the state of the economy and the insurance cycle.' 52 Citing stud-
ies which show that there is little correlation between tort reforms and the
liability insurance premiums imposed on doctors,' 53 these commentators ar-
gram during the 1980s. Id. Most states quickly cut these programs when the insurance
cycle steadied. Id. See also MARCHEV, supra note 15, at 7. Marchev explains that
"rising malpractice premiums understandably cause great anxiety and concern on the
part of physicians and may cause them to avoid high risk patients and procedures,
notably in the filed of obstetrics." Id. (citing R.A. Rosenblatt et al., Tort Reform and
the Obstetrics Crisis: The Case of the WAMI States, 154 W. J. MED. 693, 693-99
(1991)).
149. See TRENDWATCH, supra note 54.
150. See Jones, supra note 5. A coalition of the most at-risk doctors, named Doc-
tors for Medical Liability Reform (DMLR), is campaigning for Congress to impose
statutory caps on damages. Id. DMLR consists of over 230,000 of our country's "neu-
rosurgeons, orthopedic surgeons, obstetricians and gynecologists, cardiologists, tho-
racic surgeons, emergency [room] physicians, spine specialists, urologists and derma-
tologists." Id.
151. Ironically, doctors currently shoulder the responsibility of other doctors, but
they shoulder the responsibility of those doctors who make the most mistakes (rather
than those whose specialty makes them most at risk), because insurance companies do
not experience-rate physicians.
152. See, e.g., MARCHEV, supra note 15, at 1. Marchev states, "While an increase
in litigation and higher damage awards are often blamed for rising premiums, insur-
ance companies may be equally culpable due to their pricing policies of the 1990s."
Id.
153. See, e.g., Frank A. Sloan, State Responses to Malpractice Insurance "Crisis"
of the 1970's: An Empirical Assessment, 9 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 629 (1985) (in
which Sloan studied the tort reforms of the 1970s, in which more than a dozen states
enacting tort reforms limiting liability, and found that such reforms had little or no
effect on liability insurance premiums for doctors).
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gue that insurance industry reforms are the only way to prevent recurring
availability and affordability crises.'
54
Liability insurance prices are artificially low during a booming econ-
omy. Because insurers make most of their money from investment returns,'
55
they compete for premiums during good financial times.15 6 When the econ-
omy shifts, insurers must hike prices to maintain their previous levels of prof-
itability, levels which are unregulated in the law. 157 Because of the difficulty
in predicting a receding economy and because each is averse to being among
the first companies to raise its insurance rates, the premium hike comes even
later than the economy warrants. The subsequent hike is then even larger than
the economy justifies because the insurers must make up for losses they have
already begun to incur. According to these commentators, the doctors who
are at the greatest risk of being sued then face liability insurance rates that
they cannot bear.
For stability in medical malpractice law, insurance rates should not di-
rectly reflect the rise and fall of the economy, but rather should reflect the
specific costs to insurers for insuring physicians. Without some regulation of
insurance industry profits, medical malpractice problems may never be
solved.
B. Experience-rating Doctors
Currently, doctors' insurance premiums are not experience-rated.158 To-
day, malpractice premiums reflect geographic and specialty differences
among doctors rather than an individual doctor's risk of being sued. While
experience-rating is the standard procedure in most insurance contexts, it is
almost never found in the medical malpractice setting. 159 The consequence is
that "good" doctors pay for "bad" doctors' mistakes. Good doctors face
154. See FOUND. FOR TAXPAYER & CONSUMER RIGHTS, How INSURANCE REFORM
LOWERED DOCTOR'S MEDICAL MALPRACTICE RATES IN CALIFORNIA AND How
MALPRACTICE CAPS FAILED (Mar. 7, 2003).
155. See MARCHEV, supra note 15, at 6.
156. See id.
157. Id. Marchev explains how "the medical malpractice market remained stable
through the economic boom years of the 1990s. During this period, medical liability
insurance was one of the most profitable lines in the industry, and new companies
entered the market enticing customers with bargain rates." Id. (citing NAT'L ASS'N OF
INS. COMM'RS, REPORT ON PROFITABILITY 1997 (1999)). Marchev continues, "This
price war for new customers prompted many insurers to sell malpractice coverage at
rates too low to cover the costs of subsequent claims." Id. (citing Rachel Zimmerman
& Christopher Oster, Insurers' Missteps Helped Provoke Malpractice "Crisis",
WALL ST. J., June 24, 2002, at A 1).
158. Experience-rating refers to adjusting a doctor's insurance premiums based on
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higher premiums and are sometimes driven out of their specialties because of
the skyrocketing premiums resulting from bad doctors' mistakes.
Holding accountable those doctors who cause the majority of the prob-
lems serves the purpose not only of reducing low risk doctors' subsidization
of high risk doctors, 160 but of encouraging high risk doctors to take steps to
reduce risk. 16 1 Thus, the good doctors pay premiums they can afford. The bad
doctors cannot afford their premiums and are weeded out of the profession.
As the bad doctors are weeded out, there are fewer patients negligently in-
jured, and there are fewer lawsuits.
The results of holding accountable those doctors who are causing the
majority of the problems seems obvious. The doctor wins with lower insur-
ance premiums, and the patient wins with better care. This is one of the most
obvious reforms that should be implemented, but it is a reform that often gets
overlooked by state legislatures.
VII. ANOTHER POSSIBLE REFORM: NO-FAULT INSURANCE
In response to many of the problems associated with the medical mal-
practice crisis-too many victims of malpractice going uncompensated, too
much of a patient's recovery being swallowed up by litigation costs, and doc-
tors being demoralized and stigmatized by medical malpractice lawsuits-
many academics have proposed a no-fault system 162 to replace our current
malpractice system.1 63 Under a no-fault approach, patients who are injured as
a result of medical treatment receive compensation for their injuries without a
determination of whether the doctor negligently caused the injury. Under
such a system, the savings are derived predominantly by eliminating the ex-
160. Id. (stating that "[a]djusting insurance premiums through experience rating
has" the benefit that "cross-subsidization of high-risk subscribers by those of low risk
is reduced").
161. Id. (stating that "high-risk subscribers are given incentives to find cost-
effective ways to reduce risk").
162. See, e.g., Weiler, supra note 25; see also Hyman, supra note 8, at 1639;
Studdert & Brennan, supra note 23, 225.
163. See Weiler, supra note 25. Weiler proposes a no-fault approach, saying that
[c]ontrary to doctors' impressions, injured patients do not sue at the drop
of a hat .... There are far fewer suits than serious injuries; when claims
are made, juries tend to sympathize more with doctors than with patients;
and even successful plaintiffs obtain, on average, lower awards than they
are supposedly entitled to receive.
Id. at 918 (footnote omitted). He further explains that "[m]ost of the claims brought
are the wrong ones, inflicting a good deal of stress on innocent doctors and .... tort
damages are distributed in a highly erratic fashion, with a few lucky plaintiffs collect-
ing huge awards, while most of the seriously injured receive much less than their
actual economic losses." Id. at 918-19 (footnotes omitted).
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pensive litigation system 164 under which the largest costs are incurred.165 The
savings can then be funneled toward treatment of patients' injuries. Thus,
more injured plaintiffs receive compensation for their injuries, eliminating the
current system's problem of leaving so many injured patients uncompen-
sated. 166 Plaintiffs do not have to undergo the extensive, exhaustive process
of litigation and thus receive "faster, more efficient compensation."' 167 Addi-
tionally, doctors are not stigmatized because there is no determination of neg-
ligence against them.1
68
Most no-fault theories further suggest an enterprise liability system
whereby the hospital is responsible for the no-fault premiums. Under this
theory, hospitals will enact guidelines to ensure patient safety because the
hospitals will pay for the costs of negligent care.
While no-fault theories address problems in care by doctors, problems in
compensation to injured patients, and problems in rising premiums for doc-
tors, they are for the most part academic theories 69 that ignore the reality of
164. See Studdert & Brennan, supra note 23, at 229. Studdert and Brennan ex-
plain that "no fault programs absorb dramatically lower administrative costs than their
tort counterparts." Id. at 230 (referencing Robert G. Elgie et al., Medical Injuries and
Malpractice: Is it Time for 'No-Fault'?, 1 HEALTH L. J. 97, 113-15 (1993)). See also
Weiler, supra, note 25, at 926. Weiler determines that malpractice litigation is costly
for several reasons.
First, it is hard for patients to detect and document provider fault. This
process often requires extensive discovery before the essential facts are
uncovered and the claim can then be either paid or dropped. Second, doc-
tors have strong personal and professional incentives to fight hard against
any such admission or finding of carelessness on their part.
Id. Weiler then explains that medical malpractice cases take much longer even than
motor vehicle cases, because doctors insist on going to trial and malpractice lawsuits
"often involve multiple actors, each of whom spend duplicate resources in protracted
disputes involving not only the patient-plaintiff, but also each other." Id. at 927.
165. Weiler, supra note 25, at 921-22. Weiler explains that proving whether an
injury was the result of physician negligence "requires more monetary expenditures
than does payment to the few patients who successfully litigate that issue." Id.
166. See Saks, supra note 72.
167. Studdert & Brennan, supra note 23, at 229.
168. See MARCHEV, supra note 15, at 14. Marchev explains that a "no-fault sys-
tem would compensate patients for injuries without the need to determine blame or
negligence on the part of doctors or other medical providers. Injured patients would
be compensated according to a pre-determined schedule of damages." Id.
169. No-fault theories are academic theories, in the context of comprehensive
medical malpractice reform. However, Virginia and Florida have implemented no-
fault with severe neurological birth injuries, in an attempt to remove from the tort
system these cases in which causation is very difficult to prove. VA. CODE ANN. §§
38.2-5000 to -5021 (Michie 2002); FLA. STAT ANN. ch. 766.301-.316 (West 2001).
Also, the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 authorizes no-fault to han-
dle victims of vaccine-related accidents. Omnibus Health Act of 1986, title II, Pub. L.
No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3743, 3755 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-l
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the political process in which reforms must take place. 170 Currently, there is
no support for a no-fault system--not from the medical profession, not from
the plaintiffs' bar, and not from the insurance industry.' 7 With no lobby out-




When we are sick or injured, we look to doctors to heal us. When death
looms, we ask doctors to save us. The nature of the medical profession places
to -34). For critical analysis of Florida's no-fault program, see Sandy Martin, Com-
ment, NICA-Florida Birth-related Neurological Injury Compensation Act: Four Rea-
sons Why This Malpractice Reform Must be Eliminated, 26 NOVA L. REV. 609 (2002).
Martin cites the Florida legislature as providing the no-fault approach to birthing
injuries "'to provide [a] compensation [plan], on a no-fault basis, for a limited class of
catastrophic injury that result[ed] in unusually high costs for custodial care and reha-
bilitation."' Id. at 613 (quoting FLA. STAT. ch. 766.301(2) (2001)) (alterations in
original). Martin attacks the legislative purpose, saying:
The statute has had two severe structural difficulties that undermined the
faith one might have developed in the program. First, predelivery notice
was written in to Florida's version of limited obstetrical no-fault in the
hopes that NICA could survive a due process attack. Erstwhile, it puts the
provider's family and livelihood on the line, directly contradicting one of
the main legislative intents. Second, the narrow, restrictive definition of
birth-related injury also threatens the very beneficiaries it was ostensibly
designed to assist. The exceptions to coverage poke so many holes in
NICA's availability that the coverage ends up resembling Swiss cheese. It
invites litigation where some of the primary benefits of a partial no-fault
system viz a viz NICA is to avoid litigation and speed up solutions.
Id. at 644. Thus, according to Martin, even Florida's statute, aimed at curing a
specific harm in the area of OBGYN's, has failed in its stated purpose.
170. See Palmer, supra note 23, at 1623. Professor Palmer argues that "no-fault
analysis ... is not useful to the patient safety debate" because the theory "los[es] sight
of the fact that compensation might be important to others, such as potential consum-
ers of health care and the plaintiffs trial bar" and "the evidence available from studies
of limited no-fault systems for medical accidents indicates that the complete elimina-
tion of litigation of claims is nearly impossible." Id. See also MARCHEV, supra note
15, at 14 (where Marchev identifies the competing medical and legal factions as the
root causes for preventing other reforms, such as no-fault liability, from being imple-
mented). Marchv explains,
The national debate about the malpractice insurance crisis has been framed
largely as a controversy between doctors and lawyers and has centered on the
battle over tort reform. This has left little room for consideration of other re-
forms directed at making the legal system more efficient and more responsive
to injured patients.
Id.
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a huge responsibility on doctors. They are only human, and even the best
make mistakes. The medical malpractice system is supposed to protect pa-
tients who are injured because of these mistakes, but it has been doing a poor
job of protecting those patients. And while doing a poor job of protecting
patients, it is doing an equally poor job of protecting doctors. •
It is time for change in our malpractice law. State legislatures have rec-
ognized this but have limited reforms to tort law, enacting legislation aimed
at limiting the size of jury awards and reducing the number of lawsuits
filed.' 73 These are short-sighted solutions which account for problems caused
by only one of the three big actors 174 and which further perpetuate the law's
failure to protect patients. While no-fault proposals address the problems in
medicine, in the litigation system, and in the insurance industry, these pro-
posals have little practical value outside of academic circles.
This Comment has proposed that action be taken by all three major
players in the medical malpractice crisis. The first step may be to limit the
number of frivolous lawsuits because frivolous suits not only impose direct
costs on the system 75 but also perpetuate a system in which physician negli-
gence does not correlate to physician accountability.' 76 Limiting frivolous
suits can be accomplished through a screening panel system in which trial
lawyers are held accountable for the claims they file. 177 Holding these attor-
neys accountable and preventing them from merely using screening panels to
test their cases and strengthen them for trial178 is essential to making the sys-
tem work.
With the number of frivolous lawsuits reduced, 179 experience-rating
doctors' insurance premiums is the next step. It will serve to ensure that
claims against doctors more accurately reflect patients' risk under a specific
doctor's care. Thus, those doctors who are continually making mistakes will
indeed be the doctors who are paying for them. Experience-rating will then
serve to lower the insurance costs to low-risk physicians and will encourage
high-risk physicians to adopt measures to limit risk to their patients.
173. In other words, the AMA has been successffil in its campaign that our doc-
tors are not protected.
174. Only problems caused by the plaintiffs' bar are taken into account in many of
the reforms enacted by state legislatures.
175. The direct costs include the administrative costs associated with defending a
lawsuit.
176. This leads doctors to become demoralized and greatly reduces doctors' in-
centive to take measures to limit risk.
177. This can be accomplished through limitations on the number of "frivolous
lawsuits" that an attorney can file, through determinations by the screening panel. For
example, if a lawyer files three frivolous suits, that attorney can no longer file mal-
practice claims.
178. See Feigenbaum, supra note 70, at 1380.
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But experience-rating alone will not fix all liability insurance problems.
The system should spread specialists' premiums throughout the medical pro-
fession or the government should subsidize medical specialties which inher-
ently face greater malpractice risk. In other words, rather than having a sys-
tem which subsidizes the bad doctors, 180 the government should subsidize the
good doctors in high risk specialties.' 8' Combined with experience-rating,
specialist subsidization will ensure that the good doctors are not driven from
their specialties.
Finally, it is time for regulation of insurance industry profits, time for
the insurance industry to take its share of the blame and take steps to ensure
that the above measures are not undercut during times of economic downturn.
The evidence suggests that insurance companies continue to inflate rates dur-
ing prosperous times and hit doctors with heavy premium hikes during times
of economic downturn. Insurers need to adopt measures preventing premiums
from reflecting the economy by putting back rainy day reserves during pros-
perous times. Otherwise, the insurance cycle will return once again, bringing
about a fourth insurance crisis.
The fact is that the medical malpractice system is not working for doc-
tors or for patients.' 82 The reforms proposed in this Comment are not novel
ideas, but when combined they put responsibility on all three of the big play-
ers in the liability crisis. While their enactment would not be a magical solu-
tion to all of the problems, these proposals do reflect the need for some unity
among the three big players. Effective reform will take place only if each of
the players spends a little less time pointing a finger at the others and a little
more time looking in the mirror.
The reality is that if positive change is to take place, it will probably get
done along political lines. Even if the plaintiffs' bar, the medical profession,
and the insurance industry Will not voluntarily accept some of the responsibil-
ity, state legislatures need to see that responsibility lies with all three actors.
Legislators need to listen to the lobbies from all groups and develop a com-
prehensive program addressing each group's concerns. Our malpractice prob-
lems are not simply litigation problems, 183 poor medical care problems,' 84 or
insurance industry problems. 85 Only by recognizing its multiple causes will
we resolve the medical malpractice crisis.
CHANDLER GREGG
180. The bad doctors are subsidized when there is no experience-rating. Experi-
ence-rating will eliminate the subsidization of these poor performing physicians.
181. See TRENDWATCH, supra note 54.
182. See Mello & Brennan, supra note 22.
183. Masada, supra note 9; see also McAfee, supra note 12.
184. Rice, supra note 12.
185. See Casey, Jr., supra note 11.
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